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The Case of the Vanishing Supreme
Court Contest: Barrow v.
Raffensperger Eliminates the
Power of the People to Elect their
Appellate, Superior, and State
Court Judges *
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine being elected a Georgia Supreme Court Justice. You have
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on your campaign and more
than a year of your life running for election, only to have it all come
crashing down. You’ve been informed that your win is now legally
meaningless and void, even though you were chosen by the people. You
are told that it is now an office that the current Governor gets to fill
because the predecessor in the office to which you were just elected,
intentionally chose to resign two months early. This political loophole
and disenfranchisement of voters is now allowed in the State of Georgia
by the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Barrow v. Raffensperger.1
Georgia has always been a state that supports elections. We elect
everyone under the sun – from Supreme Court Justices to County
Coroners.2 In a highly contentious and publicized case, the Georgia
*I owe a special thank you to Dean Cathy Cox for her time, support, and guidance
throughout my time at Mercer Law and on this Casenote. Words cannot comprehend how
grateful I am for her mentorship over the last two years. I also would love to thank my
parents, Steven and Lisa Mallon as well as my sister, Shelby Mallon, for their
unconditional, unwavering support throughout law school. To all of my people who
consistently uplift and encourage me to be my best, thank you.
1 308 Ga. 660, 842 S.E.2d 884 (2020).
2
Telephone Interview with Former Georgia Governor, Roy E. Barnes
(September 2, 2020) (discussing the implications of Barrow v. Raffensperger and the
intentions of the Drafters of the 1983 Georgia Constitution in the establishment of
Paragraph IV of the Judicial Selection Section of the Georgia Constitution).
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Supreme Court in Barrow v. Raffensperger ultimately held that the
Secretary of State is not legally mandated to hold an election for an
office that will inevitably become vacated.3
This Casenote will address the events that led to an expedited appeal
to the Georgia Supreme Court along with an explanation of the peculiar
makeup of the Georgia Supreme Court that heard and decided this
case. Further, this Casenote will discuss and provide a background of
the law establishing both the elections and appointments of Georgia
Supreme Court Justices. In its final points, this Casenote will evaluate
the court’s reasoning in this landmark decision and the implications
that have already arisen as a result.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Justice Keith R. Blackwell was an Associate Justice of the Georgia
Supreme Court, who began his term of office on January 1, 2015.4 His
six-year term was set to expire on December 31, 2020.
On February 26, 2020, Justice Blackwell submitted a letter of
resignation to Governor Brian Kemp, stating that he “‘will conclude his
judicial service at the end of the August Term of the Supreme Court,’
and asked the Governor to ‘please accept his resignation from the
Supreme Court,’” effective November 18, 2020–only forty-three days
from the official end of his term. 5
Governor Kemp accepted Justice Blackwell’s resignation that same
day.6 Governor Kemp then notified Georgia Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger that he intended to fill the vacancy by gubernatorial
appointment. Secretary Raffensperger then decided to cancel the
scheduled May 19 election.7 He directed his staff to publicize the
decision and notify the candidates who had submitted or attempted to
submit the required qualifying fees and documents for the office.8
This case ensued when two political veterans, former U.S.
Congressman John Barrow and former state Representative Elizabeth
308 Ga. at 661, 842 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 662, 842 S.E.2d at 888.
5 Id. at 662–663, 842 S.E.2d at 888; Brief of Appellee at *5–6, Barrow v. Raffensperger,
308 Ga. 660 (2020)(No. S20A1031).
6 Id. at 663, 842 S.E.2d at 888.
7 Id. The Georgia Supreme Court recognized that “on April 9, the election for various
state and federal offices scheduled for May 19 was postponed until June 9 due to the
public health crisis resulting from COVID-19. For simplicity, we will continue to refer to
the election at issue in these cases as the May 19 election.” Id. at 660, 842 S.E.2d at 887,
n.1.
8 Id.
3
4
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Beskin, attempted to qualify for this particular election.9 The Secretary
of State’s office would not accept their qualifying papers and fees, and
informed Barrow and Beskin that the election had been cancelled.10
Shortly thereafter, both Barrow and Beskin filed separate petitions for
writ of mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-2011 against Secretary
Raffensperger in Fulton County Superior Court.12 Both petitions sought
for the Secretary to accept their applications for Justice Blackwell’s
office and place the election back on the ballot.13
Following an expedited hearing, the trial court denied both Barrow
and Beskin’s claims in separate but similar orders.14 The court found
that under Georgia law, once the resignation was accepted by Governor
Kemp, a vacancy existed for him to fill.15 As a result, Secretary
Raffensperger no longer had a statutory duty to hold the scheduled May
19 election.16 Additionally, the trial court reasoned that since the office
would be filled by appointment before December 31, 2020, the appointee
would serve a newly created term, which would now end on January 1,
2023.17 Immediately thereafter, Barrow filed an emergency motion with
the Georgia Court of Appeals, pleading for expedited consideration of

Id.
Id.
11 O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 (2019). Mandamus requires that:
All official duties should be faithfully performed, and whenever, from any
cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure to perform or from
improper performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due
performance if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights.
Id.
12 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 663, 842 S.E.2d at 888–889.
13 Id. In addition to the petition for a writ of mandamus, Appellant Beskin:
[S]ought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attorney fees and
litigation costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, claiming that the Secretary acted
under color of state law to violate her ‘right and privilege to qualify as a
candidate for her office and to vote for the candidate of her choice’ under the
United States Constitution.
Id. at 663, 842 S.E.2d at 889.
14 Id. at 663, 842 S.E.2d at 889. Beskin’s federal claims were denied for failure to state
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “she did not ‘show that her fundamental right to
vote has been denied or violated by the Governor’s lawful use of the appointment power in
this case.” Id. at 664, 842 S.E.2d at 889.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Brief of Appellee, Barrow v. Raffensperger at *2–3, 308 Ga. 660, 842 S.E.2d 884
(2020)(No. S20A1031).
9

10
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the trial court’s decision.18 This motion was then transferred to the
Georgia Supreme Court.19
Throughout the pending litigation, Barrow alleged collusion and
manipulation by the Georgia Supreme Court Justices.20 In a motion
before the Georgia Supreme Court, Barrow called for all the high court’s
justices to recuse themselves due to their relationship with their
colleague, Justice Blackwell.21 Barrow cited to the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct and asserted that the Justices’ impartiality could
reasonably be questioned if they did not recuse themselves.22
Following this motion, five of the eight remaining Justices chose not
to participate in this decision.23 However, the three remaining Justices,
Chief Justice Harold Melton, Presiding Justice David Nahmias, and
Justice Sarah Warren denied the motion filed by Barrow and insisted
there was no conflict of interest.24 To fill the seats of the five recused
18 Id. at 664, 842 S.E.2d at 889. Elizabeth Beskin was also an appellant in this suit,
with the Georgia Supreme Court addressing both appellants in a single decision. This
Casenote recognizes both Beskin’s federal claims as well as the fact that the Georgia
Supreme Court held that Beskin’s case was not moot. Id. at 666-668, 842 S.E.2d at 890892.
19 Id. at 664, 842 S.E.2d at 889. See also GA. CONST. art. VI, § VI, par. II (“The
Supreme Court shall be a court of review and shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the following cases: . . . (2) All cases of election contest.”) Id.
20
Jim Galloway, Opinion: John Barrow and the Brewing Fight over a
Vanished Supreme Court Race, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (May 8,
2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/opinionjonbarrowandthebrewingfightovervanis
hedsupremecourtrace/zjWVMo8OW8TlTpvun3uCyN.
21 Bill Rankin, Five GA Supreme Court Justices Remove Themselves From Election
Dispute,
ATLANTA
JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/five-supreme-court-justices-remove-themselves-fromelectiondispute/LFAw0Gfn4W41SAuz2Hzr3L.
22 Id. Rule 2.11 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct states:
The judge is within the third degree of relationship to any of the following
listed persons, or the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, intimate partner, or any
other member of a judge’s family residing in the judge’s household is within the
third degree of relationship to any of the following persons: (a) a party to the
proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (b) a lawyer in the
proceeding; (c) a person known by the judge to have a more than de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
or (d) a person who to the judge’s knowledge is likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
Rule 2.11, Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (2015).
23 Justices Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian J.J., all
voluntary withdrew from the case. Id.
24 Id. The order further elaborated that the three “carefully considered the motion to
recuse him or her,” without further explanation provided. Following this order, Barrow
and his attorneys were shocked that the three remaining Justices did not disqualify
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Justices, the Clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court randomly selected
five Superior Court judges from a pre-existing list to hear and decide
this case.25
In a 6-2 vote, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
ultimate decision that Secretary Raffensperger was not legally
obligated to hold the election for Justice Blackwell’s office.26 But, not for
the reasons provided by the trial court.27 In this hotly divided case, the
majority held that the Secretary of State could not be compelled by
mandamus to conduct an election that would become legally nugatory,
based on the inevitable vacancy that was to occur in Justice Blackwell’s
office.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since the ratification of Georgia’s current Constitution in 1983,
judges have been chosen “in two different ways for terms of two
different types.”29 The following analysis provides a general overview of
Georgia’s constitutional provisions, statutory law, and prior precedent
pertaining to the election and appointment of Georgia Supreme Court
Justices that led to the decision in Barrow v. Raffensperger that the
exception now takes precedent over the rule.30
A. The Rule: Justices are elected by the people for six-year terms
The rule that Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court are to be elected
to terms of office have been guaranteed since 1896 and has been
affirmed in subsequent Georgia Constitutions: 1945, 1976, and 1983.31
Article VI, Section I, Paragraph I states: “All Justices of the Supreme
themselves and called out Presiding Justice Nahmias stating: “Nahmias is notorious for
his attempts to dominate the Court.” Id.
25 Id. The judges randomly selected were Scott L. Ballard of the Griffin Judicial
Circuit, Brenda Trammell of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit, Richard Cowart of the
Southern
Judicial
Circuit,
Sarah
Wall
of
the
Oconee
Judicial Circuit, and Timothy Walmsley of the Eastern Judicial Circuit. See also
Order
Granting Emergency Motion for Expedited Consideration of Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660 (2020)(No. S20M1012, S20M1020).
26 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 661, 842 S.E.2d at 887.
27 The 100-page opinion consists of: a Majority Opinion written by Presiding Justice
Nahmias, a Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Melton, and a strong Dissenting Opinion
by Judge Trammell of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit. Id. at 660, 842 S.E.2d at 884.
28 Id. at 678, 842 S.E.2d at 898 (emphasis in original).
29 Id. at 668, 842 S.E.2d at 892.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 695, 842 S.E.2d at 909 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
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Court . . . shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of six
years.”32 To fulfill this constitutional provision, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9(b)33
administers a nonpartisan election that coincides with the “general
election next preceding the expiration of the term of office.”34 The officer
with the statutory duty of conducting this nonpartisan election is the
Georgia Secretary of State.35
From 1983 to 2012, the elections for Georgia Supreme Court Justices
were held in conjunction with the general election in early November of
even-numbered years, with qualifying held several months earlier.36 In
2011, the Georgia legislature passed an amendment to O.C.G.A. § 21-2138,37 shifting the election for Justices to coincide now with the general
primary election for other offices, typically held in the summer of evennumbered years.38 This modification meant that Justices would now be
elected to their future offices approximately six months before taking
office and created a shorter timespan to campaign between the
qualifying period and the actual election.39
B. The Exception: The Governor’s Power of Appointment to A Specialized
Term
Consequently, not all Justices initially take office by election for a
term of six years.40 Paragraph III of Article VI, Section I provides
32 Id. at 694, 842 S.E.2d at 909 (Trammell, J., dissenting). “The term of all judges thus
elected begins the next January 1 after their election.”
GA. CONST. art. VI, § I, para. I.
33 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9(b)(2019).
34 Id. See Barrow, 308 Ga. at 669, 842 S.E.2d at 892 (“The election process includes
qualifying candidates for the office, holding the general election, and – if no candidate
wins a majority of the votes – holding a runoff election.”).
35 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 677, 842 S.E.2d at 898. See also GA. CONST. art. V, § III, para.
III; GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. I; O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9(b); O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50 (2019).
36 Ga. L. 2011, pp. 678, 680.
37 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-138 (2019). This statute orders that:
The names of all candidates who have qualified with the Secretary of State for
the office of judge of a superior court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or Justice
of the Supreme Court of this state and the names of all candidates who have
qualified with the election superintendent for the office of judge of a state court
shall be placed on the ballot in a nonpartisan election to be held and conducted
jointly with the general primary in each even-numbered year.
Id.
38 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 669, 842 S.E.2d at 892–893; O.C.G.A. § 21-2-138 (2019).
39 Id.; O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132(c)(1)(2019)(establishing the qualifying dates for the general
election for Justices); O.C.G.A. § 21-2-150(2019) (establishing the date of the general
primary elections).
40 Id. at 669, 842 S.E.2d at 893.
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“[v]acancies shall be filled by the Governor except as otherwise provided
in the magistrate, probate and juvenile courts.”41
In order to determine whether an appointment is necessary, Georgia
case law mandates that first there must be an existing vacancy.42
O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1 provides a roadmap as to how a vacancy may occur.43
Section (a) of O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1 lists the various methods for which
offices “shall be vacated,” including “[b]y resignation, when accepted.”44
The language of Section (b) provides that a Governor’s appointment will
not become effective until the office has actually become vacated.45 By
contrast, the determination as to the definition of a “vacancy,” and the
term of an appointed Justice has not been as clear.
1.
What is a “vacancy” under Georgia law?
The Georgia Supreme Court in Clark v. Deal46 recently defined
“vacancy” under Article IV, Section I, Paragraph III of the Georgia
Constitution.47 It held that “the ordinary meaning of the term ‘vacancy’
is in essence, a public office without an incumbent.”48 The court
reasoned that when the 1983 Constitution was ratified, Black’s Law
Dictionary defined “vacancy” in a similar manner.49 It rationalized that
this definition was analogous to prior Georgia precedent and legal
secondary authorities.50 Therefore, the supreme court in Clark affirmed
the definition for “vacancy” under Paragraph III of Article IV, Section I,
as a “public office without an incumbent.”51
GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. III.
Clark v. Deal, 298 Ga. 893, 896, 785 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2016); Mitchell v. Pittman, 184
Ga. 877, 194 S.E. 369 (1937). See also Carey Canada, Inc. v. Hinely, 181 Ga. App. 364,
365, 352 S.E.2d 398, 399 (1986).
43 O.C.G.A § 45-5-1 (2019).
44 O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1(a)(2019); See also Compton v. Hix, 184 Ga. 749, 754, 193 S.E. 252,
256 (1937)(determining that language in O.C.G.A. § 45-5-19(a) “is mandatory and must be
given effect.”).
45 O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1(b)(2019).
46 298 Ga. at 896, 785 S.E.2d at 526–527 (affirming trial court’s decision that the three
newly created judgeships for the Georgia Court of Appeals were vacancies under
Paragraph III, which provided Governor Nathan Deal the power of appointment to fill the
three offices).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 896, 785 S.E.2d at 527.
49 Id. at 896, 785 S.E.2d at 526.
50 Id. at 896, 785 S.E.2d at 527.
51 Id. Georgia Supreme Court also determined that when a significant shift from prior
Constitutions occur, it must be given that effect in the law. Id. at 898, 785 S.E.2d at 528–
529.
41
42
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2.
What is NOT a Vacancy under Georgia law?
The Georgia Supreme Court has also clarified what does not fit
within the definition of “vacancy.” In 1937, the Georgia Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. Pittman52 explained that:
[An] office is not vacant so long as it is supplied, in the manner
provided by the [C]onstitution or law, with an incumbent who is
legally qualified to exercise the powers and perform the duties which
pertain to it.53

The court in Mitchell elaborated further, stating that if there is no
vacancy based on this definition, then the power of executive
appointment cannot be utilized.54 It argued that “[t]his power of
executive appointment is for an emergency and can be exercised only in
the case of a vacancy.”55 The court concluded that this appointment
power cannot be “effective while a duly commissioned incumbent is in
office,” and that all officers mandated to conduct these elections must do
so unless there is a proven vacancy.56
Consequently, based on the definitions provided in both Clark and
Mitchell, the Secretary of State must follow his legal duty and conduct
an election for the relevant office.57 More importantly, the Secretary of
State cannot cancel an election based on the potential likelihood of a
vacancy existing prior to the end of the term.58 The Georgia Code
requires the existence of a vacancy prior to the cancellation of an
election.59 If a Secretary were to improperly cancel an election, the
harmed parties are able to file a writ of mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 96-20.60 At the same time, however, the court could find under O.C.G.A.
52 184 Ga. 877, 194 S.E. 369 (1937)(holding that no further vacancy existed once
Governor Eugene Talmadge filled the vacancy, and the legislature could not enact a law
to fill a non-existent position).
53 Id. at 885, 194 S.E. at 373.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Barrow, 306 Ga. at 677, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
58 Id. at 677–678, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
59 Id. at 691, 842 S.E.2d at 901. See also O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1(b)(2019).
60 Id. at 677, 842 S.E.2d at 898; O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 (2019) states:
All official duties should be faithfully performed, and whenever, from any
cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure to perform or from
improper performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due
performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance if
there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights.
Id.
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§ 9-6-2661 that mandamus was not proper and the election was
“nugatory or fruitless.”62 Therefore, the presence of a vacancy or lack
thereof creates significant legal consequences.
3.
When appointed, Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court
have a specialized term of office.
The Georgia Constitution provides that if there is a vacancy on the
Supreme Court, it is to be filled by gubernatorial appointment.63
Differing from most public offices, state, superior, and appellate
appointed judges must serve a new, specialized term.64 An appointee to
a state, superior or appellate judgeship will no longer “serve out the
‘unexpired term’ of their predecessor.”65 Alternatively, Paragraph IV of
the Georgia Judicial Selection Section66 “create[s] an entirely new and
shortened initial term of office for the appointed judge,”67 and that the
appointee’s term will be until “January 1 of the year following the next
general election which is more than six months after such person’s
appointment.”68
In doing so, Paragraph IV created a definition of an initial period of
service for appointed judges that had never been specified before.69 To
clarify, most appointed public officials in Georgia serve out the
remainder of their predecessor’s term.70 Whereas, with the ratification
of Paragraph IV in the 1983 Constitution, this precedent was
eliminated for all state, superior, and appellate judges.71 Thus, the

Id. at 678, 842 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-6-26
(2019))(“[m]andamus will not be granted when it is manifest that the writ would, for
any cause, be nugatory or fruitless”).
62 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 678, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
63 GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. IV.
64 Heiskell v. Roberts, 295 Ga. 795, 798, 764 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2014).
65 Id.
66 GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. IV.
67 Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 798, 764 S.E.2d at 372.
68 GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. IV.
69 Barrow, 306 Ga. at 672, 842 S.E.2d at 895.
70 Id. See Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 799, 764 S.E.2d at 372–373 (explaining that “[u]nlike the
prior constitutional provisions . . . [Par. IV] eliminates the unexpired term of the vacant
office, so that there is no longer such a thing as an appointment to serve out the
‘unexpired term’ of an appellate, superior or state court judge.”). See also Hooper v.
Almand, 196 Ga. 52, 25 S.E.2d 778 (1943)(providing the prior constitutional scheme
before ratification of 1983 Constitution).
71 Id. at 673, 842 S.E.2d at 895; GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. IV. This significant
distinction was elaborated by the supreme court in Heiskell:
61
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importance of the enactment of this constitutional provision lies in the
distinction between terms of appointed judges and all other appointed
officials.
In Perdue v. Palmour, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
Chattooga Superior Court’s finding that the two elections at issue, set
by the county superintendent must proceed as scheduled.72 The
appellees, Carlton Vines and Albert Palmour, had resigned from their
respective positions as State Court Judge and Solicitor-General, in
order to run for each other’s positions in the 2004 election. However,
Governor Perdue announced after the qualifying period for both offices
that he planned to fill the two vacancies by appointment, which led the
County Superintendent to cancel the previously scheduled election.73
The trial court found for Vines and Palmour, claiming that the sixmonth provision in Paragraph IV would render null and void the
language that “the appointee ‘shall serve for the unexpired term.’”74 The
supreme court affirmed the determination that Paragraph IV of the
1983 Constitution “eliminates the unexpired term of the vacant office,”
but noted that it also established “a new term of office.”75 The supreme
court in Perdue elaborated further by establishing a test of “practical
balance between democracy and stability.”76 It explicitly explained:
[O]n one side of the coin, someone appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring at the beginning of a six-year term will not be immune
from voter consideration for that entire period; he would have to run
in the next general election. On the other side of the coin, someone
appointed between June and November of a general election year
[when the nonpartisan general election was held in November] would
not have to run immediately and would have a little over two years to
demonstrate his qualifications as a judge .... The six-month provision
was not intended to, nor does it in fact, disenfranchise voters. . . [It]
gives the voters the right to select the holders of elective office yet
The same Article and Section of the 1983 Constitution that abolished the old
system for the selection and terms of office of appellate, superior, and state
court judges explicitly preserved the then-existing system for “[a]ll other judges
… until otherwise provided by local law,” and authorized the filling of
“[v]acancies … in the magistrate, probate, and juvenile courts” by methods
other than gubernatorial appointment if “otherwise provided by law.” Art. VI,
Sec. VII, Pars. I and III.
Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 799, 764 S.E.2d at 373.
72 278 Ga. 217, 600 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
73 Id. at 217-218, 600 S.E.2d at 371.
74 Id. at 219, 600 S.E.2d at 372; GA. CONST. art. VI, § VII, para. IV.
75 Id. at 221, 600 S.E.2d at 374 (Carly, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 220, 600 S.E.2d at 373.
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affords the appointee a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate the
merit, or lack thereof, of the appointee’s service.77

The court in Perdue concluded that the trial court’s decision wholly
negates Paragraph IV and that the elections for State Court Judge and
Solicitor General should be cancelled, as they had become appointed
positions for Governor Perdue to fill.78
A decade later, the Georgia Supreme Court in Heiskell v. Roberts79
adopted the prior precedent from Perdue v. Palmour and ascertained a
clearer interpretation.80 In Heiskell, the Court established that there is
“no longer such a thing as an appointment to serve out the ‘unexpired
term.’”81 It explained that the effect of these provisions Paragraph III
and IV “is to create an entirely new and shortened term of office for the
appointed judge.”82 Therefore, Paragraph IV has been determined by
the supreme court as valid precedent and provided a significant
influence on the court’s decision in Barrow v. Raffensperger.83
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Barrow v. Raffensperger, the Georgia Supreme Court, as a matter
of first impression, addressed whether a Secretary of State could be
compelled by mandamus to hold an election to fill an office with an
inevitable vacancy on the Georgia Supreme Court.84 The court agreed
with the trial court’s ultimate finding that “the Secretary of State could
not be compelled by mandamus to hold the May 19 election for Justice
Blackwell’s office,” but disagreed with the reasoning behind the
decision.85
A. Majority Opinion
Presiding Justice David E. Nahmias, writing for the majority began
with the assertion that the constitutional provision requiring the
election of Justices to a six-year term in Paragraph I, is not
constitutionally superior to the provisions supporting gubernatorial

Id. at 220–221, 600 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 221, 600 S.E.2d at 373.
79 295 Ga. at 795, 764 S.E.2d at 368.
80 Id. at 798–799, 764 S.E.2d at 372–373.
81 Id. at 799, 764 S.E.2d at 372–373.
82 Id. at 798, 764 S.E.2d at 372.
83 308 Ga. at 670-671, 842 S.E.2d at 893–894.
84 Id. at 662, 842 S.E.2d at 888.
85 Id. at 661, 842 S.E.2d at 887.
77
78
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appointment in Paragraphs III and IV of Article VI, Section I.86 The
dissent claimed that the court was enforcing a preference for
appointments over elections.87 The court rebutted this assertion, stating
that it is not attempting to provide preference of appointments over
elections, nor exempt appointed Justices from the election process.88
The majority continued, analyzing that the 1983 Constitution “does say
expressly and specifically when an appointed Justice must face
election,” under both Paragraph IV and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9.89
In the court’s discussion of appointments versus elections, they
allocated particular attention on the importance of Paragraph IV’s
“initial period of service for judges appointed to elective office.”90 The
majority urged that when a significant shift from prior Constitutions
occur, it must be given that effect in the law.91 It emphasized the
importance of the specialized term for appointed judges “by the fact that
the serve-out-the-existing-term way,” was still in place for most other
appointed public offices in the state of Georgia.92
Likewise, the court reiterated that based on the Perdue v. Palmour
balancing test, “Paragraph IV represents ‘a practical balance between
democracy and stability.’”93 It also rejected Barrow’s assertions that this
constitutional provision disenfranchises voters.94 The majority
maintained that the specialized term under Paragraph IV was endorsed
by the people of Georgia when they ratified the 1983 Constitution.95 It

Id. at 671–672, 842 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 672, 842 S.E.2d at 894.
88 Id. at 672, 842 S.E.2d at 894–895.
89 Id. at 672, 842 S.E.2d at 894 (emphasis in original). To put this in statutory terms,
as noted earlier:
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9(b) says that Justices ‘shall be elected in the nonpartisan
general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office.’ When an
incumbent vacates his or her office before his or her term ends, the date of
‘expiration of the term of office’ changes from December 31 of the year in which
the prior incumbent’s term would have ended to December 31 of the year in
which the appointed Justice’s term will end as calculated based on Paragraph
IV.
Id. (emphasis in original).
90 Id. at 672, 842 S.E.2d at 895 (emphasis in original).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 673, 842 S.E.2d at 895.
93 Id. at 674, 842 S.E.2d at 896; Perdue, 278 Ga. at 219, 600 S.E.2d at 372.
94 Id.
95 Id.
86
87
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concluded by endorsing the proposal that: “the appointment mechanism
for initial service of Justices . . . has been the norm, not the exception.”96
In its second major argument, the court examined the power of the
Secretary of State to hold elections, and if necessary, to cancel
elections.97 The Secretary of State has the official duty to conduct
elections for Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court.98 The majority
contended that when a vacancy in an incumbent Justice’s office occurs,
the need for an election is eliminated.99 In doing so, the Secretary of
State will no longer have a legal duty to operate the election and
“cannot be compelled by mandamus to do so.”100 Appellee Raffensperger
conceded, and the majority acknowledged, that Secretary Raffensperger
could not cancel the election for Justice Blackwell’s office because a
vacancy is “expected or even highly likely to occur.”101
Nonetheless, the court determined that if a vacancy “will inevitably
occur before the Justice’s term of office expires,” then the Secretary will
not bear legal duty to conduct the election by a petition of mandamus.102
They emphasized that the election would become meaningless and
legally nugatory under Paragraph III and IV of the Judicial Selection
Section of the Georgia Constitution.103 They elaborated that since the
incumbent Justice’s office was to become vacant before the end of the
scheduled term, December 31, 2020, “that term and any future term
associated with that Justice,” has been eradicated.104 For this reason,
the majority concluded that an election to fill an eliminated term would
be nugatory, and mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-26 could not apply.105
Id.
Id. at 677, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 677, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 677–678, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
102 Id. at 678, 842 S.E.2d at 898.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 680, 842 S.E.2d at 900. Pertaining to policy implications, the court stated
that:
[H]olding an election for the non-existent next term of a Justice who vacated
his office, even if is result would be legally meaningless, could produce some
political or other abstract benefit for the candidate who wins, such as
influencing the Governor to appoint the winning candidate to fill in the
vacancy or increasing the candidate’s name recognition for a future election.
There would be more obvious practical detriment from holding such an
election, including the costs to the taxpayers and the burden on election
officials of conducting a legally meaningless election, and the likelihood that
voters and the public would be misled into believing that the election’s result
96
97
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On the matter of a current vacancy, the majority admitted that
Justice Blackwell’s office was not presently vacant at the time of the
decision.106 They disagreed with the trial court’s findings that there was
a present vacancy in the Justice’s office, which occurred as a result of
Governor Kemp’s acceptance of the resignation letter.107 They held that
the trial court’s reliance on O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1(a)(2) was misplaced
because the resignation of Justice Blackwell would not become effective
until November 18, 2020 and there was not a present vacancy in the
office.108 The court endorsed this assertion by stating “Justice Blackwell
is continuing to serve as a Justice, performing all the duties and
functions pertaining to that office.”109
In its analysis, the majority relied on the definition of “vacancy” to
establish the current lack thereof.110 It explained that based on Clark v.
Deal, Justice Blackwell’s office is “conspicuously not ‘without an
incumbent.’”111 The court determined that instead, it “is supplied in the
manner provided by the constitution or law, with an incumbent who is
legally qualified to exercise the powers and perform the duties which
pertain to it.”112 It leaned on O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1 as well, and held that
Georgia’s statutory law cannot alter the interpreted meaning provided
in Clark v. Deal for “vacancy” under Paragraph IV of the Georgia
Constitution.113 It noted that O.C.G.A. § 45-5-1 “sets forth how an office
can be vacated but not necessarily when” it will become vacated.114
In its conclusion, the majority affirmed the trial court’s ultimate
decision that Secretary Raffensperger could not be compelled by
mandamus to conduct an election that would be “legally nugatory.”115
They held that “if Justice Blackwell’s office will inevitably be vacated
on or before November 18,” a vacancy under Paragraph III of the

would have the legally binding result that elections normally have. But these
policy considerations are beside the point, because mandamus is concerned
with the legal effect of compelling official conduct.
Id. at 679, 842 S.E.2d at 899 (emphasis in original).
106 Id. at 680, 842 S.E.2d at 900.
107 Id. at 680–681, 842 S.E.2d at 900.
108 Id. at 681, 842 S.E.2d at 900.
109 Id. at 680, 842 S.E.2d at 900.
110 Id. a 681, 842 S.E.2d at 900.
111 Id. (emphasis in original).
112 Id.; Mitchell, 184 Ga. at 885, 19 S.E. at 373.
113 Id.; Clark, 298 Ga. at 897, 785 S.E.2d at 528.
114 Id. at 679, 842 S.E.2d at 899 (emphasis in original).
115 Id. at 682, 842 S.E.2d at 901 (emphasis in original).
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Georgia Constitution is created.116 As a result, the future term of a
Justice elected to Blackwell’s office is eliminated, and under Paragraph
IV, the new specialized term for an appointed Justice will not end until
2022.117
B. Concurring Opinion
In a short and sweet concurring opinion, Chief Justice Melton
supported the majority opinion and the ultimate result; but wrote
separately to “emphasize that this case is not about this Court’s choice
between elections and appointments.”118 Justice Melton continued by
explaining that the court made its decision based on the current
language of Georgia’s Constitution and the Georgia Code.119 The Chief
Justice recognized the great debate pertaining to judicial appointments
versus elections, but as a judge, it was not his job to “usurp that power
by rewriting constitutional provisions.”120 In his conclusion, Justice
Melton opined that if Georgians did not agree with the decision in this
case, they could fix it by amending the 1983 Georgia Constitution.121
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Brenda Trammell authored the dissenting opinion in this case,
agreeing with many of the arguments made by the majority.122
However, Judge Trammell dissented because she found the majority’s
Id. at 681, 842 S.E.2d at 901 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 682, 842 S.E.2d at 901. This Casenote will not address the second issue as to
“whether, under Georgia law, a Justice’s “prospective” resignation, tendered
unequivocally in writing but effective only as of a future date, may be withdrawn after the
Governor has formally and unequivocally accepted it as effective on that same date.” The
Georgia Supreme Court found that such resignation cannot be revoked lawfully, “even if
both the Justice and the Governor consent to its purported withdrawal before its effective
date.” Id.
118 Id. at 691, 842 S.E.2d at 907 (Melton, C.J., concurring).
Additionally, it’s important to note that three other judges joined this concurrence:
Justice Warren, Judge Cowart and Judge Walmsley. Id.
119 Id. at 691–692, 842 S.E.2d at 907-908 (Melton, C.J., concurring).“This is simply the
manner in which the law works when we apply the relevant constitutional provisions
ratified by the people of Georgia to the facts of this case.” Id. at 692, 842 S.E.2d at 908.
120 Id. at 692, 842 S.E.2d at 908 (Melton, C.J., concurring).
121 “The genius of our democracy is that, to the extent the people of Georgia now
second-guess the system of elections and appointments they ratified in the 1983
Constitution, they have the power to seek amendment to that foundational document.” Id.
(Melton, C.J., concurring).
122 Id. at 693, 842 S.E.2d at 908 (Trammell, J., dissenting). Judge Scott L. Ballard of
the Griffin Judicial Circuit joined this dissenting opinion as well. Id.
116
117
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preference of appointments over elections to “den[y] the people the right
to elect their Justice[s] provided by the Constitution.”123 The dissent
disagreed with the majority’s belief that a gubernatorial appointment
was constitutional in this case.124
While the majority held that the constitutional provisions pertaining
to elections and appointments in Article IV, Section I, Paragraphs I and
III to work in tandem, Judge Trammell opposed this notion and held
that the majority had missed a major point.125 “The power of
appointment is an exception to the general rule requiring that Justices
be elected,” and in fact, are “constitutionally inferior,” to elections.126
Specifically, the dissent noted that the mandatory language of “shall” in
both Paragraph I and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-9 mandated elections.127 Further,
the dissent pointed out that in Clark v. Deal, the majority had
acknowledged that “appointment was an ‘exception’ to the general
policy of elections.”128
Most importantly, the dissent emphasized that for the first time, “the
Governor’s power of appointment is now being held superior to the
people’s right to vote,” based on two principals: (1) the period of service
mandated in Paragraph IV, and (2) “the language of the timing of the
election for the vacated seat.”129 The dissent agreed with the majority
that there was not a present vacancy in Justice Blackwell’s office nor
would one exist until November 18, 2020.130
The dissent yielded to the fact that generally there would not be a
question that the appointee would “have a right to remain in the seat
without,” having to face voters in the next six months in an election.131
It clarified further that this notion is “the balance between democracy
Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 693–694, 842 S.E.2d at 908–909 (Trammell, J., dissenting)(quoting Mitchell,
184 Ga. at 885, 194 S.E. at 369)(“This power of executive appointment is for an emergency
and can only be duly exercised only in a case of a vacancy. It cannot be exercised to be
effective while a duly commissioned incumbent is in office.”) “It is well known to all of us
that the primary object to be secured by the amendment of 1896 was to withdraw the
elective power of the Justices from the General Assembly of the State and to lodge it with
the sovereign people, and to increase the number of judges.” Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga.
372, 379, 6 S.E.2d 728 (1939). See also Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. 1548,
1577 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
128 Id. at 695, 842 S.E.2d at 909 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 695, 842 S.E.2d at 909–910 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 695, 842 S.E.2d at 910 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
123
124
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and stability referred in Perdue v. Palmour and Heiskell v. Roberts.”132
The difference here however, was that this resignation will become
effective after a regularly scheduled election for the Justice’s office.133
The dissent ended this argument with a warning:
For the first time since the enactment of this constitutional provision,
the majority is ruling that the appointment power of the Governor
trumps the voting power of the public. Let me be clear. This ruling
means that even were the election to go forward and a winner be
declared, the appointee defeats the electee.134

In its overall conclusion, the dissent discussed three potential
scenarios in which the holding in this case would create serious
problems in the manner of filling judicial offices:
A. A sitting judge determines he will not run again at the end of his
term. An election is held, and a successor elected. The judge dies
before the end of the term. The Governor then appoints a
replacement, and the election is in essence voided.
B. The incumbent runs for election, loses, and then resigns, only to be
re-appointed by the Governor.
C. The incumbent does not stand for election, an election is held, the
incumbent does not like the result of the election and resigns to avoid
the taking of the office by the elected official.135

As a final point, Judge Trammell acknowledged that she in fact was
initially appointed by Governor Nathan Deal.136 However, she could not
“in good conscience agree that the election should be cancelled and the
will of the people thrust aside as ‘fruitless and nugatory.’”137 And
because of the disregard for the voices of the people, she added, “I
respectfully dissent.”138

132 Id. at 695–696, 842 S.E.2d at 910 (Trammell, J., dissenting); Palmour, 278 Ga. at
221, 600 S.E.2d at 374; Heiskell, 295 Ga. at 799, 764 S.E.2d at 372–373.
133 Id. at 696, 842 S.E.2d at 910 (Trammell, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
134 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 702–704, 842 S.E.2d at 914 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 706, 842 S.E.2d at 915 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Trammell, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPLICATIONS
Immediately after the Georgia Supreme Court announced this
decision, this opinion sparked swift and widespread public backlash,
both in the national and state media.139 The concerns related to the
belief that there is now dangerous precedent set for partisan politics to
become further inserted into the nonpartisan positions of Georgia’s
judiciary.
As a result of Barrow v. Raffensperger, state election results for
judges now are nothing more than the world’s most reliable poll.140 This
landmark decision by the Georgia Supreme Court has created a
blueprint for vast expansion of a governor’s power to shape the state’s
legal system while ignoring the voices of the electorate in judicial
contests.141 This decision removed power from the people, both as voters
and as potential qualified candidates.
A. The Effects Have Already Begun: The Case of Judge Tommy Smith
One of the consequences predicted in the dissent occurred within the
first election cycle following this decision.142 Judge Tommy J. Smith
won the June 9, 2020 election for a Superior Court judgeship in the
Middle Georgia Judicial Circuit with 71% of the vote.143 However, after
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars and over a year of
campaigning, Smith was later informed that his election victory was

139 Ian Millhiser, Georgia Republicans Cancel Election for State Supreme
Court, So Governor Can Appoint a Republican, Vox Media (May 19, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/5/19/21262376/georgia-republicans-cancel-election-statesupreme-court-barrow-kemp-blackwell.
See also Kate Brumback, Georgia High Court Election Cancellation
Headed For Appeal, AP NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/349de8f3753
4149dfdc28da4b6689093.
140 Jonathan Ringel, Superior Court Election Was a ‘Nullity,’ Say Secretary
of State’s Lawyers, DAILY REPORT (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/
2020/08/19/superior-court-election-was-a-nullity-says-secretary-of-states-lawyers/.
141
Jim Galloway, Opinion: In Judicial Races, It’s Now Vital That Your
Rival Doesn’t Quit in a Huff, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (May 27, 2020), https://ww
w.ajc.com/blog/politics/opinion-judicial-races-now-vital-that-your-rival-doesn-quithuff/VpkyJ31ByzmZEXtLsGfeOJ/.
142 Barrow, 308 Ga. at 703–704, 842 S.E.2d at 914 (Trammell, J., dissenting).
143 Jonathan Ringel, Superior Court Election Was a ‘Nullity,’ Say Secretary of State’s
Lawyers, DAILY REPORT (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/
08/19/superior-court-election-was-a-nullity-says-secretary-of-states-lawyers/.
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now legally meaningless.144 The office to which he had been elected, the
Superior Court judgeship, became an appointed office for Governor
Brian Kemp to fill as a result of the resignation of the predecessor,
Judge Kathy Palmer. Judge Palmer had resigned on April 13, 2020 to
run for the Georgia State Senate. However, the June 9 election for the
judgeship was not cancelled, unlike the election in Barrow v.
Raffensperger.145
The good news in Judge Smith’s case was that Governor Kemp did
appoint him to the office he was duly elected to by the people, and he
became a Superior Court Judge in the Middle Georgia Judicial
Circuit.146 The catch is, however, that instead of a full four-year term,
Judge Smith will only be in office for a shortened two-year term as a
result of his appointment, instead of election. Smith will have to run
again in 2022 for a full four-year term. Judges statewide will continue
to face issues like this based on the monumental expansion of
gubernatorial appointment power by the court in Barrow v.
Raffensperger.
B. Controlling the Chaos: Legislative Change
In order to prevent this chaotic process from seeping further into
Georgia’s judiciary, a change would most likely have to be made by the
Georgia General Assembly. The Judicial Selection Section of the
Georgia Constitution has not been amended since its ratification in
1983. There are a variety of methods the Georgia legislature could take
to provide further clarification, both in the Georgia Code and in the
current Constitution.
As for Georgia statutory law, the Georgia Code could be amended to
provide public officials the ability to resign from their current office
without creating a chain effect that would cancel the upcoming election
for their office. Additionally, an amendment might be made to the
language of the six-month provision of Article IV, Section I, Paragraph
IV to provide further clarity as to the intentions of the drafters. This
amendment could be crafted to provide potential limitations on
resignations occurring within a certain number of months before the
end of the Justice’s six-year term. Finally, the General Assembly could
clarify the priority for filling judicial vacancies by election, rather than
appointment, to maintain the longstanding primacy of electing officials
in the state of Georgia.
Id.
Id.
146 Id.
144
145
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Unless the Georgia General Assembly provides legislative
clarification or an amendment to the Constitution or the Georgia Code,
Georgia Governors—of either political party—will continue walking
through the wide door opened by the Georgia Supreme Court in Barrow
v. Raffensperger to thwart the electoral will of Georgia voters at their
discretion. Will the evident confusion be sufficient to cause the
legislature to act? Or will Georgia become a state that no longer enjoys
judicial elections? Only time, and a few more election cycles, will tell.
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